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Summers v. State, Nev. Adv. Op. No. 112 (Dec. 28, 2006)1
 
CRIMINAL LAW – CAPITAL PENALTY HEARING 
Summary 
Appeal from a judgment of conviction, entered after jury verdict, for first-degree murder 
with the use of a deadly weapon, and assault with the use of a deadly weapon, attempted murder 
with the use of a deadly weapon, and assault with the use of a deadly weapon, and from 
sentences of life in prison without the possibility of parole. 
Disposition/Outcome 
Affirmed.  The confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and the United States Supreme Court Holdings in Crawford v. Washington2 do not 
apply to evidence admitted during a capital penalty hearing.  This and other issues raised on 
appeal do not warrant reversal of his conviction and sentence. 
Factual and Procedural History 
Summers was an illegal drug dealer.  During 2003, Summers entered into an informal 
agreement with Fredrick Ameen (an addict who owed Summers money) to sell “crack” cocaine, 
and to pay for a motel room from which he could sell the drugs; Summers would of course 
receive the profits from the sales.  On the night of December 28, Summers warned Ameen that 
only certain people were to be allowed in the motel room.  Later that night, Ameen, his associate 
Albert Paige, a friend of Ameen and prostitute, Donna Thomas, and two others were in that room 
smoking crack cocaine. When Summers later arrived, accompanied by Andrew Bowman, he was 
upset about the number of people in the room.  Ameen told everyone to leave; Paige and Thomas 
stayed behind. 
Bowman briefly left the room, but he soon returned and handed Summers a .38 caliber 
handgun.  Summers pulled out the handgun, pointed it at Thomas, and asked Ameen who she 
was.  Ameen explained that she was a friend, and that he had told Thomas about Summers and 
had instructed her to come into the room.  When Summers asked if Thomas knew who he was, 
she replied in the negative.  Ameen reminded Thomas that he had previously told her about 
Summers, and when she began to speak Summers shot her. 
Summers then pointed the gun at Paige and pulled the trigger, but the handgun misfired.  
Summers then pointed the gun at Ameen, but Ameen did not see Summers pull the trigger.  
Summers and Bowman left the room, and Thomas later died from the gunshot wound. 
Summers was arrested and charged with several crimes, and the State sought a death 
sentence.  After a four day trial, the jury found Summers guilty of the first degree murder of 
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Thomas with the use of a deadly weapon, the attempted murder of Paige with the use of a deadly 
weapon, and of assaulting Ameen with the use of a deadly weapon. 
Prior to the penalty hearing, Summers moved to bifurcate the hearing into eligibility and 
selection phases.  The district court denied the motion without explanation.  The State introduced 
victim impact evidence, showing that Thomas was the mother of three children and had worked 
hard to support them before she moved to Las Vegas.  The State then presented numerous 
witnesses who testified about Summer’s juvenile and adult criminal history while both in and out 
of jail, as well as 835 pages of documents regarding the history.  Several police officers testified 
of Summer’s criminal past, including reaching into his waistband for a gun after being stopped 
by a police officer for jaywalking, gang affiliations, carjacking with the use of a deadly weapon, 
and problems while in jail. 
Summers called several family members to testify on his behalf, stating that his mother 
and father were alcoholics, his parents beat him, and that he had an impoverished childhood.  
Summers had asked to be removed from the courtroom prior to the start of the hearing and did 
not make a statement in allocution. 
The jury found four circumstances aggravated the murder and six mitigating 
circumstances.  The jurors concluded that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the 
mitigating circumstances and imposed a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for 
Thomas’ murder.  The district court entered a judgment of conviction, sentencing Summers to 
more than two consecutive terms of life in prison without the possibility of parole. 
Discussion 
Application of the Confrontation Clause and Crawford v. Washington to a capital penalty 
hearing 
Summers’ first argument was that the Confrontation Clause and Crawford3 apply to a 
capital penalty hearing and therefore the admission of nearly 835 pages of documentary exhibits 
containing testimonial hearsay violated his right to confrontation.  The court disagreed.  Neither 
the Confrontation Clause nor Crawford apply to evidence admitted at a capital penalty hearing 
and the decision in Crawford does not alter Nevada Law. 
Crawford4states that the admission of testimonial hearsay statements violates the 
Confrontation clause unless the declarant is unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior 
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.  However, the Nevada Supreme Court has never 
fully addressed the relevance of the Confrontation Clause in a capital penalty hearing.  In Lord v. 
State the Nevada Supreme Court ruled that the right to confrontation applies in capital penalty 
hearings in one respect: admitting a nontestifying codefendant’s confession generally without 
confrontation violates a defendant’s right to confrontation under Bruton v. United States.5  Lord 
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5 Lord v. State, 107 Nev. 28, 43-44 (1991). See also Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 137 (1968). 
addressed only the Bruton question and did not otherwise explore the right to confrontation at a 
capital penalty hearing, thus limiting Lord to its facts. 
Guiding this decision was the Supreme Court’s ruling in Williams v. New York,6 which 
stated, “most of the information now relied upon by judges to guide them in sentence[ing] would 
be unavailable if information were restricted to that given in open court by witnesses subject to 
cross examination.”7  The Court rejected the contention that a death sentence based on 
information from witnesses who were not cross examined violated the Due Process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Williams has since been relied upon to make the Confrontation Clause 
inapplicable to capital sentencing, despite the case’s questionable viability.  Crawford did not 
overrule Williams, the U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed whether Crawford has any bearing 
on any sentencing proceedings, no federal circuit court of appeals has extended Crawford to 
capital penalty hearings, and Crawford does not apply to a non-capital sentencing proceeding.  
Additionally, under NRS 175.552(3) hearsay is generally admissible8 in a capital penalty 
hearing.9
Other claims raised by Summers on appeal
Summers raised additional claims on appeal of a biased juror, judicial misconduct, and 
cumulative error.  The court concluded that Summers was not entitled to relief on any of these 
claims. 
Concurring/Dissenting Opinions 
Justice Rose, with whom Justices Maupin and Douglas agreed, filed an opinion 
concurring in part and dissenting in part.  While J. Rose agreed that Summers was not entitled to 
relief, they opined that the Confrontation Clause and Crawford apply to capital sentencing 
hearings. 
J. Rose explained that the two aspects of a capital penalty hearing treat evidence 
differently.  The eligibility phase stresses the need for channeling and limiting the jury’s 
discretion to ensure that the death penalty is a proportionate punishment.10  Thus, certain 
evidence is excluded in the eligibility phase11 and allowed  in the selection phase.  J. Rose also 
opined that subsequent U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, which has recognized that death is 
different.12  Additionally, in one Supreme Court case, certain testimony was admissible in a 
capital penalty hearing because evidence rules anticipate that underprivileged evidence should be 
admitted and left for the factfinder to rule on, who would have the benefit of cross-examination 
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8 See Hollaway v. State, 116 Nev. 732, 746 (2000). 
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and opposing evidence.13  Since Summers’ hearing was not bifurcated, the concerns of imposing 
the death sentence arbitrary or capricious manner Confrontation Clause and Crawford still exist.  
Accordingly, while capital penalty hearings may not necessarily need bifurcation, if the hearings 
are not bifurcated then the right to confrontation should apply throughout the entire hearing. 
Despite these general concerns, the constitutional error of no right to confrontation was 
harmless because the verdict cannot be attributed to the error.  The nature of Summers’ criminal 
background, the nature of the murder in this case, and the sentence of a term of life in prison 
without the possibility of parole instead of a death sentence all indicate that leaving the 
testimony on record did not render the finding erroneous. 
Conclusion
Neither the Confrontation Clause, nor Crawford extend to evidence admitted during a 
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